

Notes: 23 May 1966

1. Want BE; (want Mai out; Thang also; but afraid to tell OSA). Don't believe Van, Porter. Need OSA support; OSA must accept. If Chan goes to VT, confrontation in 24 hours.

(Move Hq. to Ridge Camp; office; comm. office; secretaries, Americans in shorts...)

2. OSA thinks program almost perfect; if changes, little + slow.

3. Training bad (political): that it good because

1. PATS better than PF; now chiefs want PATS;

Maj. Mai. Mai strategy: to be different from other

VNese. Political training - OSA thinks - based on moral

example of Mai. (C. would have "political commissars" with

each group, 24 hours for 13 weeks; secret guides just "police.")

3. US upgrade corruption, Chan especially on handful of VNese they think are honest; but handful of individuals can't win war.

Must change system: e.g. salaries of officials.

4. Must have National Assembly: so generals will speak to US with some confidence, have backing; now must try to impress,

rather than speak the truth.

5. ~~But~~ Now, people hold US responsible for everything; Ky does things US doesn't even know of, but US is held responsible.

6. "Will you believe me ... my sincere, confident, disinterested people believe US has committed, firm policy to destroy every nationalistic element that might stand up to them, oppose; to have weak, chaotic gov they can control indefinitely.
(Why?) To have base; to contain SU/CC. Hence, against assembly.

7. (Why didn't they ask for assembly earlier?) They wanted, but didn't have nerve or power of Tri Q. many.

(I'm surprised when I said, many US didn't believe USSR other than Tri Q. really wanted elections.)

"I blame them for not asking, acting, earlier."

8. People in countryside don't think specifically of elections, assembly. "What they do want is: 1) To know what the gov is doing; 2) to be able to tell the gov what they want, what their needs are, to have a voice, and influence."

at all levels of gov; especially local.

Elections only one means (good one); other devices possible (e.g. invite people to attend village council meetings) for people to be heard ("noticed").

And they do want a gov that can speak for them to U.S.

8. Agree on reform of Army (wants elected committee to run, at least personnel management; note, promotion already based on "politics" (others who have served under C. as Lt. or major generals).

9. "I blame US mainly for not being effective. French were more effective.

US should involve itself more deeply in VNese affairs.

But should 1) make more use of experts, qualified people;

2) find ways to learn faster.

Phou Chif says: my advisors are so stupid, ignorant, it's no use explaining problems to them; but if I say "Yes; that's right. Now, here is what I want to do, they say "Fine" and give me money."

11. AID/MACV support fine; but OSA more flexible. Need
contingency fund.

I Hart to Raymond at party: "So you're the one who's
trying to ^{steal} ~~take~~ our cadre program away from us."

H. in favor of big Aging expansion, into "Community
Development" worldwide.

On RD paper

Chair: Super-Ministry Tasks:

1) Elections: village, national

(Ruge: stress village — Strat Hove showed
hamlet too small, though in Center, could certify
some "hamlets" as villages) (But also encourage hamlet
leadership — in part by direct election of ~~hamlet~~
village chiefs, instead of by hamlet chiefs. (?)

(In 1956, Diem replaced a former corrupted
inadequate system — comb. of "consensus," cooption,
election: local in nature — by appointing village chiefs,
from village, dist, prov: intent was to improve quality.
But didn't work. Go back to elections.

On "organization": Chair agrees orgs must have
purpose: agric. coops, veterans, home econ, etc.

Not Viet Minh/Rev — style "age groups," etc.

Chair thinks orgs come first: Ruge says, parallel
with village elections.)

C informed by the uniformity of sentiment between the VC squad leader in the South and the high-level commander in the Center, the communication between them: a) They believe people are unhappy, poor, they are fighting for their benefit, at least in the next generation; b) US has just replaced the French; the GVN is tool of US interests.

On GVN side, leaders don't know why they are fighting. Fighting against Coms; OK in short run, but how long? For what benefit? For whom?

1) One small group: GVN is bad, but Coms are worse; necessary to oppose.

2) Small: VC will win in the end; be on winning side.

3) Larger: just working for pay, as official or officer.

4) Largest: Caught, as a cog in the machine; unhappy, hope to get free as soon as possible.

Very small group think that Coms would be worse than GVN; others "have no idea; have heard of brutality of VC, but know of brutality of GVN; have no

real sentiment. " sympathetic (between sympathetic
+ sympathetic)

Chan: talked to high NVA official, trying to
find out his motives (above). Chan's
motives for anti-Comm:

C wants traditionalism + modernization.

Modernize without sacrificing traditional values,
feeling, relationships, culture

(Koreans are right to forbid soldiers to
take out candy or money; NVA will scramble
for it, but down later will feel degraded,
ashamed, useful).

C wants land ~~&~~ reform — gradual —
but without violence, without destroying current
land-owners, without violence.

C wants social revolution, but without
brutality, without destroying pride in old culture.

Possible?

Use foreign capital (Coms refuse).

(and money in VN: US influence).

(Nor do it at Com tempo -

Here, no need for Com controls, Party, etc
[But: violence? and with US influence help? Will
US capital be enough?]

Is the US formula: military dictatorship?]

Prop: Pac can work with change at the
top. It will not without that.

[Kear's funeral: "US will vindicate this [my thoughts]
5 years from now."

COMMS TREAT PROBLEM AS ZERO-SUM (MARX):

Conflict (to death): to improve lot (and power, dignity)
of poor, must destroy/poison rich. But can help poor,
by gov reform that don't hurt rich; ^{or disorganize society} help both by develop, for. capital
(rather than land reform, in short run).

(Daa; Au Tien Thanh; Negroponte, Shaplan, Calhoun
Bunker; Abrams;

